USA v. Boyd Stacey by unknown
2014 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-20-2014 
USA v. Boyd Stacey 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Boyd Stacey" (2014). 2014 Decisions. 615. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014/615 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2014 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 13-3373 
_____________ 
  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
  
v. 
  
BOYD DALE STACEY, 
 
                                  Appellant  
___________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(No. 2-12-cr-00015-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Cathy Bissoon 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
May 22, 2014 
 
____________ 
 
Before:  McKEE, Chief Judge, CHAGARES, and GARTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: June 20, 2014) 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION  
____________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 Boyd Dale Stacey entered a conditional guilty plea to a one-count indictment 
charging him with failing to register as a sex offender, and to update his sex offender 
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registration, between November 4, 2011 and January 2012 in violation of the Sex 
Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a).  For the 
following reasons, we will affirm the judgment of conviction. 
I. 
We write solely for the parties and will therefore recount only those facts that are 
essential to our disposition.  On September 25, 2000, in the State of Florida, Stacey 
pleaded guilty to violating the Computer Pornography and Child Exploitation Prevention 
Act, Fla. Stat. § 847.0135(2), and to committing lewd or lascivious conduct, see Fla. Stat. 
§ 800.04(6)(a)(2) and (b).  He was sentenced to 364 days of imprisonment on each count, 
to run consecutively.  On January 30, 2002, Stacey registered as a sex offender at the 
Pinellas County, Florida Sheriff’s Office.  Stacey provided a permanent address in Largo, 
Florida and a temporary address in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.  Appendix (“App.”) 122. 
SORNA became effective on July 27, 2006.  The statute required individuals 
convicted of sex offenses after its enactment to comply with certain federal registration 
requirements, see 42 U.S.C. § 16913, and it imposed federal criminal penalties for failure 
to register or to update a registration, 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a).
1
  SORNA delegated to the 
                                              
1
 Section 2250(a) provides that any person who:   
 
(1) is required to register under [SORNA];  
(2)(A) is a sex offender as defined for the purposes of [SORNA] by 
reason of a conviction under . . . the law of any territory or possession of 
the United States; or  
(B) travels in interstate or foreign commerce . . .; and  
(3) knowingly fails to register or update a registration as required by 
[SORNA];  
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United States Attorney General the authority to determine whether the Act’s registration 
requirements would apply to pre-SORNA sex offenders.  42 U.S.C. § 16913(d).  On 
February 28, 2007, the Attorney General issued an immediately effective Interim Rule 
providing that SORNA’s registration requirements also applied to preenactment 
offenders.  Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 72 Fed. 
Reg. 8894-01, 8894–95 (Feb. 28, 2007) (codified at 28 C.F.R. § 72.3).  The Interim Rule 
was “finalize[d]” on December 29, 2010, in a Final Rule effective January 28, 2011.  
Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 81849-
01, 81849–50 (Dec. 29, 2010). 
At some point, Stacey moved from Florida to Pennsylvania and from Pennsylvania 
to Ohio.  Stacey failed to complete registration in Pennsylvania at the end of 2011, and he 
also did not register in Ohio.  On January 25, 2012, a grand jury in the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania returned a one-count indictment 
charging Stacey with failing to register as a sex offender and to update his sex offender 
registration, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a), from November 4, 2011 to “in or 
around” January 2012.  Stacey filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, which the court 
denied in an order entered on May 6, 2013.  On July 18, 2013, Stacey entered a 
conditional guilty plea to the charge.  Under the terms of his plea agreement, Stacey 
reserved the right to appeal from the District Court’s denial of his motion to dismiss.  The 
District Court sentenced Stacey to twenty-one months of imprisonment, with credit for 
                                                                                                                                                  
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than [ten] years, or 
both. 
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time served, plus twenty years of supervised release and a $100 special assessment.  
Stacey timely appealed. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our standard of review for a district 
court’s denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment is mixed.  United States v. Reynolds, 
710 F.3d 498, 506 (3d Cir. 2013).  We review a district court’s legal conclusions de novo, 
and we review its factual determinations for clear error.  Id.  Our review over 
constitutional issues is plenary.  United States v. Pendleton, 636 F.3d 78, 82 (3d Cir. 
2011). 
III. 
 Stacey’s principal argument is that § 16913(d) violates the nondelegation doctrine, 
which requires Congress to provide, at a minimum, an “intelligible principle” to guide the 
Attorney General in the exercise of delegated rulemaking authority.  Touby v. United 
States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991) (quotation marks omitted).  While Stacey’s appeal was 
pending, this Court decided United States v. Cooper, --- F.3d ---, 2014 WL 1386816 (3d 
Cir. Apr. 10, 2014), which held that SORNA does not violate the nondelegation doctrine.  
Id. at *9.  We are bound by this holding.  See Chester ex rel. NLRB v. Grane Healthcare 
Co., 666 F.3d 87, 94 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[A] panel of this Court cannot overrule an earlier 
binding panel decision; only the entire court sitting en banc can do so.”).  Therefore, the 
District Court correctly denied Stacey’s motion to dismiss on the nondelegation ground. 
IV. 
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 Stacey also contends that:  (1) he did not receive notice of his obligation to register 
under SORNA and therefore did not “knowingly” fail to register under § 2250(a)(3), 
rendering his prosecution a violation of due process; and (2) SORNA’s application to 
pre-Act offenders violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.  These arguments are similarly 
foreclosed by binding precedent.  Namely, in United States v. Shenandoah, 595 F.3d 151 
(3d Cir. 2010), abrogated on other grounds by Reynolds v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 975 
(2012), this Court held that § 2250(a) “is not a specific intent law” and rejected the 
defendant’s argument that his due process rights were violated based on lack of notice 
given that “every State had registration requirements for sex offenders” when SORNA 
was enacted.  Id. at 159, 160.  The Court also rejected the defendant’s ex post facto 
challenge to SORNA, reasoning that the statute “creates a new punishment for a new 
offense, this new offense being traveling in interstate commerce and failing to register as 
a sex offender under SORNA after July 27, 2006.”  Id. at 158.2  Thus, the District Court’s 
                                              
2
 Stacey contends that the Supreme Court’s decision in Reynolds, and this Court’s 
decision in that case on remand, “casts doubt” on whether Shenandoah remains good law.  
See Stacey Br. 25, 29, 31 n.12, 35 n.13.  In Reynolds, the Supreme Court considered 
whether SORNA’s registration requirements applied to preenactment offenders between 
July 27, 2006 (when SORNA took effect) and February 28, 2007 (when the Interim Rule 
was promulgated).  132 S. Ct. at 979, 980.  The Court held that SORNA’s requirements 
do not apply to preenactment offenders until the Attorney General “validly specifies” 
their applicability, id. at 980, and it remanded for this Court to consider, in the first 
instance, whether the Interim Rule set forth a valid specification, id. at 984.  On remand, 
this Court held that the Interim Rule was promulgated in violation of the Administrative 
Procedure Act.  710 F.3d at 502–03.  The Supreme Court’s Reynolds decision thus 
abrogated our holding in Shenandoah that SORNA’s registration requirements applied to 
pre-Act offenders from the date of SORNA’s enactment; it did not affect our due process 
and ex post facto holdings.  Cf. United States v. Brown, 740 F.3d 145, 148 n.6 (3d Cir. 
2014) (citing Shenandoah in declining to address the defendant’s ex post facto and due 
process challenges to SORNA). 
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denial of Stacey’s motion to dismiss on ex post facto and due process grounds was not 
erroneous. 
V. 
  For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of conviction. 
